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The global financial crisis has re-confirmed the need to regulate 
cross-border finance. As this consensus has emerged, some 
policymakers and academics have expressed concern that many 
nations may not have the flexibility to adequately deploy such 
regulations because of trade and investment treaties they are 
party to. This policy brief argues that such concerns are largely 
justified, and offers remedies to make the trading system more 
compatible with the proper regulation of global finance. 
In June 2012, the Global Economic Governance Initiative at Boston University s´ Frederick 
S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future—along with the Center for the 
Study of State and Society from Buenos Aires, Argentina and the Global Development and 
Environment Institute from Tufts University, USA—convened a workshop of the Pardee Task 
Force on Regulating Global Capital Flows to perform a “compatibility review” of the regimes 
for regulating cross-border 
finance and for international 
trade and investment. 
That process revealed that 
there may be a number of 
incompatibilities between the 
ability to regulate cross-border 
finance and disciplines under 
the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the myriad “free 
trade agreements” (FTAs) and bi-lateral investment treaties (BITs) that many nations have 
agreed to over the past decade. In general, the review found that FTAs and BITs are far more 
incompatible with the ability to regulate cross-border finance than is the WTO regime. 
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This effort builds on an initial workshop of the Task Force that resulted in a report 
titled “Regulating Global Capital Flows for Long-Run Development.” In that report the 
Task Force asserted that capital account regulations (CARs), traditionally referred to as 
“capital controls,” were an essential part of the 
macroeconomic toolkit for emerging market and 
developing countries. The Task Force stressed that 
CARs on inflows and outflows of capital should 
be a permanent part of a series of counter-cyclical 
measures to smooth financial booms and busts in a 
nation in order to create the proper environment for 
long-run growth. The Task Force also noted that at 
times it may be necessary for nations to cooperate 
on “both ends” of capital flows in order to regulate 
cross-border finance in an efficient manner. 
In this paper, we highlight the main incompatibilities 
between capital account regulations and the trading 
system that were identified by members of the Task 
Force, and offer concrete remedies to reconcile the incompatibility between the ability to 
deploy capital account regulations and the trade and investment regime. 
results of compatibility review Between cars and the Trading System
Members of the Task Force were asked to review agreements at the WTO and various FTAs 
and BITs to examine the extent to which the trading regime was compatible with the ability 
to deploy effective capital account regulations. A number of potential incompatibilities were 
found between the WTO and the ability to deploy CARs. Even more alarming is the lack of 
policy space to use CARs under a variety of FTAs and BITs — especially those involving the 
United States.
Box 1 shows the main features that contrast the WTO and BITs/FTAs with respect to CARs. 
On the whole, the WTO is more conducive to regulating finance than are FTAs and BITs, 
though there is significant potential incompatibility in terms of process; the WTO is a “one 
country, one vote” system that thus enables significant coalitions to form among emerging 
market and developing countries (EMDs). Moreover, negotiations at the WTO, for financial 
services, take a “positive list” approach whereby nations get to choose which sectors 
to liberalize and even put limitations or conditions on such liberalization. Indeed, Chile 
liberalized trade in cross-border financial services but reserved the right to deploy CARs  
when monetary authorities saw it as necessary (Saez 2006). 
In contrast, FTAs and BITs are products of asymmetric bargaining power, often pitting a 
large country against a smaller one where market access to the larger is conditioned on large 
concessions by the smaller nation. This is accentuated by the “negative list” approach to the 
negotiation where a nation has to liberalize all of its financial services except for those that a 
nation lists to protect. This is problematic because of the weaker negotiating position of EMDs 
and the lack of ability to anticipate future financial services and how they might be regulated.
Under the WTO, when nations choose to liberalize financial services — either through what is 
called “Mode 1” trade in financial services or “Mode 3” establishing a commercial presence 
(foreign direct investment) for financial service providers under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATs) — they do have to open their capital account in order for those 
services to contract. FTAs and BITs, in contrast, require free transfers associated with all 
“ Under investor-state provisions, private 
firms and investors may directly file claims 
against governments that regulate capital. 
Therefore, those sectors that may bear 
the cost have the power to externalize the 
costs of financial instability to the broader 
public while profiting from awards in 
private tribunals.” 
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covered investments, which are defined broadly. This obligation requires — in effect — a full 
opening of the capital account among parties to the agreement. 
The WTO also has a balance of payments safeguard (Article XII), general exception (Article 
XIV) and a prudential measures defense often referred to as a “carve out” (Article 2(a) of the 
Financial Services Agreement). FTAs and BITs typically only include one of the above. 
Disputes at the WTO are conducted among 
nation states and sometimes involve the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
expertise. FTAs and BITs almost never involve 
monetary authorities, and offer both state-
state and investor-state dispute resolution. 
In these cases, private investors can directly 
file claims against nation-states for alleged 
violations to a treaty.
The World Trade organization
Although the WTO requires a more limited 
opening of the capital account and may 
have a broader level of safeguards, some 
members of the Task Force raised a number 
of concerns about the ability of nation-states 
to deploy CARs while maintaining their commitments under the GATs. Under the GATs if a 
nation makes commitments under Mode 1, it is required to open the capital account to allow 
those services to transact and is not permitted to regulate capital flows. Additionally, it is not 
clear that the GATs safeguards give ample room for nations to deploy CARs.
If a nation does not make any GATs commitments in Modes 1 or 3, of course it is free to 
regulate cross-border finance as it deems appropriate. If a nation does list Mode 1 or Mode 3 
commitments, some degree of capital account liberalization is required. The IMF (2010) notes 
the following:  
WTO members must allow cross-border (inward and outward) movements of capital if these are an essential 
part of a service for which they have made liberalization commitments regarding its cross-border supply 
(without establishment). For example, international capital transactions are an integral part of accepting 
deposits from or making loans to nonresidents (mode 1). International capital transactions are also usually 
associated with financial services such as securities trading on behalf of a customer residing in another country. 
The establishment of a commercial presence (mode 3) in a host country by a foreign services supplier involves 
both trade in services and international capital transactions. In permitting the establishment of a commercial 
presence, WTO members must allow inward (but not outward) capital transfers related to the supply of the 
service committed.
However, the GATS has three safeguard provisions that may allow nations to derogate from 
their commitments. The most relevant components of each safeguard are shown in Box 2.
With respect to the balance of payments safeguard, some members of the Task Force echo 
concerns from the legal literature about Article XII (see Viterbo 2012). It may be that the GATs 
balance of payments safeguard does not adequately guarantee that nations can use measures 
to regulate both the inflow and outflow of capital because there is no reference to derogations 
to maintain “financial stability.” Moreover, 2(c) in the balance of payments exception states 
that measures “shall not exceed those necessary” to deal with the circumstances that a 
Box 1: WTo vs FTas-BiTs
WTo FTas/BiTs
One country, one vote Asymmetric bargaining power
Positive list  Negative list
Narrow free transfers requirement Expansive free transfers requirement
Covers all financial services Covers all financial services and 
investment
Balance of payments safeguard  
and prudential carve out
Typically only includes either a BOP 
or a prudential defense, not both
State-to-state dispute settlement Investor-state dispute settlement
measure is trying to prevent or mitigate. 
This amounts to what is called in WTO law 
a “necessity test” and could give a dispute 
panel authority to rule that an alternative 
measure could have been used. Furthermore, 
some members of the Task Force expressed 
concern over 2(e). Requiring that measures 
be “temporary” may not give nations ample 
time to meet their stated goals.
Some members of the Task Force also 
expressed concern that the requirements 
for use of the WTO s´ balance of payments 
procedures is overly cumbersome, especially 
for smaller developing countries. WTO 
rules require that nations file substantiating 
information to the WTO during the very 
crisis that a nation is working hard to 
mitigate. In a country like Ecuador, a recent 
example, this required the time and money 
of various regulators and trade negotiators 
— time and money perhaps better spent on 
crisis mitigation.
The GATS also has a provision often referred 
to as the “prudential carve-out” (Article 2(a) 
of the Financial Services Agreement). This 
exception allows members to deviate from 
their commitments “for prudential reasons” 
to ensure the protection of investors or to 
“ensure the integrity of and stability of its 
financial system.” The GATS adds that if the 
prudential measures deviate from a nation´ s 
GATS commitments “they shall not be used 
as a means of avoiding the Contracting 
Party s´ commitments or obligations under 
the Agreement.” Some members of the Task 
Force echoed concerns in the legal literature 
that “prudential reasons,” while not defined, 
may not cover CARs and that the sentence 
stating that prudential measures should not 
breach a party’s commitments could be seen 
as “self-cancelling.”
It should be stressed that there has not been 
a case where this language has been tested 
with respect to CARs. Some members believe that existing language will be sufficient. Indeed, 
Ecuador is leading an effort to clarify the extent to which nations looking to re-regulate their 
financial systems can do so under the “cover” of these safeguards. However, Ecuador’s inquiry, 
for cautious reasons, was careful not to mention very specific measures or disciplines. While a 
formal decision on this matter has thus far been blocked, Ecuador has received on-the-record 
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Box 2:  Key Safeguards relevant to cars
GATS Article XII: Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments
1.  In the event of serious balance-of-payments and external financial 
difficulties or threat thereof, a Member may adopt or maintain 
restrictions on trade in services on which it has undertaken specific 
commitments, including on payments or transfers for transactions 
related to such commitments. It is recognized that particular 
pressures on the balance of payments of a Member in the process 
of economic development or economic transition may necessitate 
the use of restrictions to ensure, inter alia, the maintenance of a 
level of financial reserves adequate for the implementation of its 
programme of economic development or economic transition.
2.   The restrictions referred to in paragraph 1: 
(a) shall not discriminate among Members; 
(b) shall be consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the 
 International Monetary Fund;  
(c) shall avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic  
 and financial interests of any other Member; 
(d) shall not exceed those necessary to deal with the circumstances  
 described in paragraph 1; 
(e) shall be temporary and be phased out progressively as the  
 situation specified in paragraph 1 improves.
3.  In determining the incidence of such restrictions, Members may  
give priority to the supply of services which are more essential 
to their economic or development programmes. However, such 
restrictions shall not be adopted or maintained for the purpose  
of protecting a particular service sector.
Article 2(a) of the Financial Services Agreement
2. Domestic Regulation 
 (a)   Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a 
Member shall not be prevented from taking measures for 
prudential reasons, including for the protection of investors, 
depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty 
is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity 
and stability of the financial system. Where such measures do 
not conform with the provisions of the Agreement, they shall 
not be used as a means of avoiding the Member’s commitments 
or obligations under the Agreement.
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assurances from many OECD countries, including the United States, that the GATS safeguards 
leave ample room to maneuver to prevent and mitigate financial crises (WTO 2011). 
Free Trade agreements and Bi-lateral investment Treaties
While reviews are mixed on the WTO, members of the Task Force unanimously agreed that many 
FTAs and BITs may be significantly incompatible with the ability of nations to deploy CARs. 
Most FTAs and BITs are wider in scope than the WTO. Whereas the GATS only covers capital 
transfers related to trade in financial services, FTAs and BITs often cover all transfers between 
parties. In addition, transfers are often broadly defined as any investment, including stocks, bonds, 
currencies, derivatives, direct investment and beyond. Thus a much broader number of investments 
must be allowed to be transferred “freely and without delay” among parties to an agreement.
A developing country often is put at a disadvantage when negotiating an FTA or a BIT that 
includes a “negative list” approach, whereby a nation is expected to liberalize all sectors except 
a handful where it still wants to regulate. Thus if a nation wanted to regulate a new financial 
“innovation” in the future, such as a new form of derivative, that nation would not be permitted 
to regulate the related investments because it hadn’t anticipated the innovation and reserved the 
right to regulate during the negotiation. Of course, such anticipation is impossible.
Astonishingly, many FTAs and BITs do not have a balance of payments safeguard and/or a 
prudential carve out. Those that do have a balance of payments safeguard are often modeled 
after the GATS Article XII and thus have the same concerns described above (lack of clear scope 
for inflows and outflows, a necessity test, and restrictions of temporariness). Among the few 
agreements that have a prudential carve out are those with the United States (which generally 
do not have balance of payments safeguards). However, most U.S. treaties tie the definition of 
“prudential” more closely to policies pertaining to “individual financial institutions” and also 
include the potentially “self-canceling” language found in the GATS. Moreover, U.S. negotiators 
have repeatedly stressed that existing language does not pertain to the use of capital controls 
(Saez 2006, Taylor 2003, Geithner 2011). Indeed, a handful of U.S. treaties have annexes that 
note how capital account regulations are deviations from commitments but require an extended 
“cooling off” period before foreign investors may file claims for compensation. One treaty, the 
United States-South Korea FTA, allows South Korea to deploy regulations as specified under its 
law as long as such measures meet a number of limitations specified in the Annex. 
The IMF has expressed concern that many FTAs and BITs lack the adequate safeguards to put 
in place CARs: “The limited flexibility afforded by some bilateral and regional agreements in 
respect to liberalization obligations may create challenges for the management of capital flows” 
(IMF 2012, 8). The IMF has developed an institutional view on the use of CARs that defines 
CARs as “measures affecting cross-border financial activity that discriminate on the basis of 
residency”(IMF 2011). Therefore forbidding nations to violate “national treatment” in treaties 
may thus constrain the ability of nations to use CARs in general and under IMF advice in 
particular. Some U.S. treaties allow nations to deploy price-based taxation measures on capital 
flows, or have an annex that allows a nation to deploy CARs as long as they meet national 
treatment requirements. Such limitations may nullify the ability to use CARs by definition. 
Moreover, such incompatibility may make it more difficult for nations to accept the IMF policy 
advice based on its new institutional view. 
Finally the Task Force expressed serious concern about the use of “investor-state dispute 
resolution” in cases pertaining to CARs in FTAs and BITs. WTO disputes are settled “state-to-
state” and therefore nation-states can negotiate on behalf of the well-being of entire nations and 
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financial systems — looking for situations where the benefits to the majority outweigh losses 
to a minority. However, that cost-benefit analysis is tipped on its head under investor-state 
disputes. Under investor-state provisions, private firms and investors may directly file claims 
against governments that regulate capital. Therefore, those sectors that may bear the cost 
have the power to externalize the costs of financial instability to the broader public while 
profiting from awards in private tribunals.
Making the Trade regime compatible with regulating Financial Flows
Members of the Pardee Task Force discussed how a variety of procedures could yield 
substantive reform at the WTO and in FTAs and BITs. Box 3 outlines a range of reforms and 
clarifications that could be undertaken at the WTO and under FTAs and BITs.
While Task Force members agree that the WTO is likely more compatible with CARs than 
BITs and FTAs, there are a number of uncertainties that could be remedied. The Article XII 
balance of payments safeguard could be interpreted or amended to include measures to 
ensure “financial stability” and development, not be limited to temporary measures, and not 
be subject to a necessity test. Moreover, nations wishing to evoke Article XII should be able 
to register and notify the WTO after the fact, rather than in the midst of a crisis. This would 
allow nations to focus on the mitigation tasks at hand. 
In the prudential carve out, the language pertaining to 
“prudential” would be clarified so as to include the use 
of CARs, and the language that has been interpreted by 
some as self-canceling would be deleted.
FTAs and BITs will require more significant reform. At 
the negotiating table, at least with emerging market and 
developing countries, financial services and transfers 
provisions could be conducted using a “positive list” 
approach as in the WTO. This would allow nations 
to liberalize specific sectors as they reach appropriate 
threshold levels of institutional development and not bar 
the possibility of future regulations that may be needed. 
The definition of investments and investors could be 
narrowed to leave the most unstable types of investment 
(such as sovereign debt, short-term debt and equity, 
currency trade, and derivatives) to the realm of national 
and global regulators, not trade treaties. This has been 
recommended by some IMF officials and more recently 
listed as a possible option by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development in a new set of 
guidelines it has issued on investment agreements (Hagan 
2000; UNCTAD 2012). 
Treaties should have balance of payments safeguards and 
prudential carve outs that allow for the use of CARs in 
a similar manner to the reforms we suggest for the GATS. Perhaps most importantly, where 
trade and investment treaties do overlap with financial regulatory reform they should be 
subject to state-to-state dispute settlement and in consultation with appropriate monetary 
and economic policy authorities and experts. 
www.bu.edu/pardee
Box 3: Potential reforms to the Trading System
WTO Reforms  
1.  The balance of payments exception should be 
broadened to allow nations to regulate capital inflows 
and outflows for financial stability and development
2.  The process for activating balance of payments 
exceptions should be streamlined
3.  Prudential carve out should clearly allow for the use  
of capital account regulations
Reform of FTAs and BITS 
1.  Negotiate commitments with a “positive list” approach
2.  Consider excluding certain kinds of investments as 
beyond the scope of agreements
3.  Include balance of payments safeguards that clearly 
allow for the use of CARs
4  Include a prudential carve out that clearly allows for 
the use of CARs
5  Ensure that disputes are resolved by nations states and 
in collaboration with financial and monetary regulators
7
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There are a variety of processes and procedures that could lead to these reforms:
1. refrain from taking on new commitments in regimes incompatible with the ability to 
deploy cars. Nations could refrain from making Mode 1 and Mode 3 commitments under 
GATS altogether, and refrain from signing FTAs and BITs without proper safeguards and 
dispute settlement. Of course, in the current WTO negotiations many nations are essentially 
doing this by not further liberalizing current GATS commitments, and nations such as Brazil 
and others are not signing FTAs and BITs. However, that is not an option for the numerous 
nations that already have GATS commitments and are party to FTAs and BITs that lack the 
proper policy space for regulating capital flows. Though some nations, such as Bolivia and 
Ecuador, have begun withdrawing from their treaty obligations altogether.
2. adopt “interpretations” of existing treaty language. Both the WTO and FTAs-BITs 
allow for “interpretive notes” or amendments that could clarify or change existing language 
in current treaties. Article IX: 2 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO allows the WTO 
Ministerial Conference or the General Council to adopt — with a three-quarters majority 
— official interpretations of the GATS on the basis of a recommendation of the Council 
for Trade in Services. Moreover, CARs could be included in “Recognition Agreements” 
among willing parties, as allowed by Article 3 of the GATS Annex on Financial Services. For 
example, an interpretive note could clarify that language under the GATS for the balance of 
payments exception and the prudential carve out cover the use of CARs in the manner that 
is recommended here. Ecuador has engaged with the Committee on Financial Services in a 
process that could lead to an interpretation of this kind. For FTAs and BITs such processes 
exist as well. U.S. Congresspersons Barney Frank and Sander Levin have together asked the 
United States Treasury to issue an interpretive note that would allow the proper flexibilities to 
deploy CARs under U.S. treaties.
3. amend existing treaties to reconcile current incompatibilities. Another route to reform 
would be formal amendments to existing treaties. Amendments to the GATS can be submitted 
to the Ministerial Conference by a member or by the Council for Trade in Services, and be 
adopted by consensus or with a two-thirds majority vote. For an Amendment to enter into 
forcé, it must be ratified by two-thirds of WTO members. Nevertheless, a new set of guidelines 
for investment treaties that better balances investor protection and development includes 
amending existing treaties as an option for reform (UNCTAD 2012).
4. design new rules for future treaties. Treaties currently under negotiation or future treaties 
could be designed to have a narrower definition of investment, negative list negotiations, 
adequate balance of payment and prudential carve out exceptions, special and differentiated 
treatment, and dispute settlement procedures that exhaust domestic remedies and have state-
to-state dispute settlement in consultation with macroeconomic and monetary authorities and 
experts. The new UNCTAD guidelines make recommendations along these lines. Nations such 
as Australia have begun to negotiate trade deals without investor-state-dispute settlement. 
Each of these processes and procedures has its own costs, benefits, and level of political 
feasibility that will vary on a case-by-case basis. Some members of the Task Force prefer a 
preventative approach to clarify and amend existing agreements now, before such language is 
tested in dispute settlement bodies. However, some expressed caution that certain procedures 
may open a Pandora’s box and leave the trading system even more incompatible with the 
adequate regulation of global finance. But there is no disputing that the analyses conducted 
by the Task Force makes clear that several areas in the trading system are potentially 
incompatible with the ability of nations to deploy capital account regulations for stability, 
growth, and development. •
www.bu.edu/pardee
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